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Constant Individual Regret in General Games

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Uncoupled no-regret dynamics provide a decentralized route to equilibrium, but prior guarantees for individual regret retain a polylogarithmic dependence on the horizon. We remove this dependence for every finite $N$-player normal-form game under full-information feedback. We introduce \emph{ECHO-OFTRL}: optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) equipped with an EMA cascade for high-order optimism (ECHO), where EMA denotes exponential moving average. The algorithm is deterministic and fully uncoupled. If $m_{\max}$ denotes the largest action-set size, then, simultaneously for every horizon $T\geq1$, it guarantees that each of the $N$ players in the game incurs regret upper bounded by $O(\textrm{poly}(N, \log m_{\max}))$. Our algorithm leverages a new form of optimism inspired by modern filter design.

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